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Paradigm Lost, Paradigm Regained
Groping for the Mind of Medieval Japan
William R. LaFleur
Over the YEARS since its initial publication in 1962, Thomas S. 
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' has had a ripple effect 
far beyond the study of the physical and biological sciences. One can­
not be certain that Kuhn intended or even welcomed such an extension 
of his work into the so-called “softer” disciplines; nevertheless, it ex­
ists and has already had, in contemporary philosophy for instance, a 
profound effect. In their introduction to the initial volume in a new 
series on “Ideas in Context,” its editors reflect on the Kuhnian impact. 
They contrast it with the “pre-Kuhnian” way of doing things that had 
until recently been typical in Anglo-American analytical philosophy; 
they note that the analytical philosophers had disdained history, usual­
ly holding that until themselves there had been “nothing which could 
be called ‘the history of philosophy’, but only a history of almost- 
philosophy, only a pre-history of philosophy.”* 2 * They go on to 
epitomize the difference as follows:
’ University of Chicago Press, 1962.
2 “Introduction,” in Richard Rorty, J. B. Schnee wind, and Quentin Skinner, eds.. 
Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy (Cambridge, Lon­
don, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 12.
’ Ibid., p. 12.
On that [analytical) sort of view, questions do not change but 
answers do. On a Kuhnian view, by contrast, the major task 
of the historian of a scientific discipline is to understand when 
and why the questions changed?
This new interest in “the rise and fall of questions” is hard to overlook 
in contemporary philosophy; it informs, for instance, Richard Rorty’s 
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widely-discussed Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.4 5It has also 
begun to show up in the work of some historians of Western religions 
but, at least to my knowledge, has had little or no impact on our ways 
of dealing with religions and philosophies that had their origin outside 
the ambit of the West—even though the word “paradigm” has 
sometimes been used in a somewhat loose sense.
4 Princeton University Press, 1979.
5 University of California Press, 1984.
6 Especially Susan Matisoff in Monumenta Nipponica 39:2 (Summer 1984), pp. 191- 
195.
7 James H. Sanford, “Paradigms and Poems: A Review of LaFleur’s The Karma of 
Words," The Eastern Buddhist 17:2 (Autumn 1984), pp. 124-133, and Martin Col- 
Icutt, The Journal of Japanese Studies 11:1 (Winter 1985), pp. 146-152. Since Collcutt 
and Sanford do not take issue with my unorthodox use of “medieval"—as not equal to 
the Japanese chQsei—I do not discuss it here but refer interested readers to my book’s 
discussion of the matter.
Although not the main focus of the book, my The Karma of Words: 
Buddhism and the Literary Arts in Medieval Japan* attempted an ex­
ploration of what a Kuhnian approach to medieval Japan might yield. 
I had long been convinced that, in spite of the fascinating materials 
offered by the study of medieval Japan, such study in our academy is 
divided into a number of disparate and unconnected disciplines. Not 
only is the domain divided between institutional and intellectual 
historians but the latter is further parceled out to the very different 
methodologies of the Buddhologist, the comparative philosopher, and 
the historian of religion. My hope was that, at the very least, the intro- 
jection of a Kuhnian approach to the topic might stimulate interest in 
looking more carefully how these different methodologies intersect and 
how they might more profitably interact as well.
My book has now been tested by a number of reviewers, many of 
whom focused on the literary issues.6 Martin Collcutt and James H. 
Sanford, however, in quite separate ways,7 raised questions about my 
approach to Buddhism in Japanese history and the editors of this jour­
nal subsequently offered me these pages for response. Both Sanford 
and Collcutt paid my book a number of compliments and I hope that 
they will not read what follows as suggesting that I am an ingrate. But 
since it would be neither seemly nor interesting to dwell on those com­
pliments, I will here merely express my thanks for them and go on to 
discuss the points where I detect misunderstandings or genuine
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differences of approach. In order that this may have value even for per­
sons unfamiliar with my book or the Collcutt and Sanford reviews, I 
will try here to focus on the broader issues of methodological import. 
The bulk of the documentation cannot be reintroduced here and for 
that I will refer the curious reader back to the book itself.
Cartwheels or Trapeze Acts?
Anyone who today uses the word “paradigm” or the phrase 
“paradigm shift” in a book or article is likely to invite the suspicion 
that he or she is trying to be modish rather than intelligible. Often the 
terms are used without great precision. 1 decided that, in spite of such 
dangers, the term “paradigm” was important enough for my purposes 
and I hoped that my usage would be justified by whatever new light it 
might throw on the materials and epoch under consideration. My 
hypothesis was that many Buddhologists’ and intellectual historians’ 
tendency to channel our understanding of Japanese Buddhism through 
the writings and personalities of the “great” Buddhist thinkers of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries—figures such as HOnen, Shinran, 
Eisai, DOgen, and Nichiren—sometimes leads to a certain historical 
distortion. That is, if medieval Japan can be looked at in terms of “the 
rise and fall of questions,” then it seems clear that the making of that 
epoch took place some centuries earlier. Perhaps to some extent Kuhn 
forces us to restore some of its original meaning to the term “epoch- 
making” when we use it to describe the work of a thinker or, more col­
lectively, a group of thinkers who shape a given era’s major intellectual 
concerns and concepts. Thus it seems to me that the great figures 
associated with the Kamakura period, in spite of their obvious 
brilliance, religious profundity, and powerful impact on developing— 
and continuing—institutions, were not quite “epoch-making” in the 
same way as those Buddhists who, a few centuries earlier, laid down 
the foundation for a completely new way of thinking in Japan.
The fact that KOkai (774-835) and SaichO (766-822) were such 
“epoch-makers” would seem unobjectionable. Less clearly so deserv­
ing of attention is the work of Kydkai, a monk of negligible status who 
wrote the Nihon ryoiki at the end of the eighth century. My argument 
in The Karma of Words was that his work was much more than a 
rustic’s loose weaving together of miracle-stories and legends and is, in
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fact, an intelligent and intelligible work with an underlying argument 
in spite of its bizarre episodes.8 My point was that it is an unusually 
good aperture for us at our distance to observe how the mental shape 
of medieval Japan was formed—especially since it vividly presents 
ways in which ordinary people in their everyday contexts could under­
stand their lives in terms of karma and the concept of transmigration 
through the six realms of existence (rokudd ^it). In the context of that 
discussion I claimed that it might be best to think of Kydkai as offering 
in his work an entire new “paradigm"—that of karma and the rokudd 
taxonomy—whereby his contemporaries would understand themselves 
and their world. That this book—along with roughly contem­
poraneous other works—had a lasting impact is evidenced by the fact 
that soon afterwards the notion of karma had become a virtually un­
questioned concept, taken to be immediately intelligible and beyond 
need of proof by Heian and Kamakura period writers and poets. The 
evidence for this is, I think, exceedingly strong.
That to which James Sanford took special exception, however, was 
my additional contention that the category of “religion” is not quite 
adequate to encompass all the things karma was assumed by Kydkai 
and his contemporaries to explain. Sanford is a defender of the 
customary perspective taken by most professional students of religion; 
he insists that the intention of the tales of the Nihon rydiki is primarily 
“salvational and religious.”9 He objects to my reading as follows:
A confusion between Kydkai’s alleged attempt to give a ra­
tional explanation to reality and the objective basis of 
modern, Western scientific views of the external world, leads 
LaFleur into cartwheels and backflips of interpretation when 
he tries to reconstruct the objective medical anomalies that he 
supposes underlay Kydkai’s stories.10
• There is some movement also within Japanese scholarship to see the connections 
between “legendary literature” and the history of ideas; see, for instance, Osumi 
Kazuo, “Setsuwa to rekishi: ChOsei kizoku no ishiki,” Shisd no. 732 (June 1985), pp. 
24-35. Richard Rorty notes that in any adequate intellectual history we must also in­
clude “all those enormously influential people who did not get into the canon of the 
great dead philosophers”; see “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” in 
Rorty et al., eds., Philosophy in History, p. 69.
9 Sanford, p. 127.
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In response I think that Sanford has misunderstood my argument to 
some extent but there is also here a significantly different way of look­
ing at a medieval text. In order to clarify this I will here try to move the 
discussion through two steps: how a medieval text differs from a 
modern one, and how a medieval Buddhist text differs from one, for in­
stance, from medieval Christian Europe.
For some time before writing The Karma of Words I had gained the 
impression that there are things going on in medieval Japanese Bud­
dhism which lay outside the role and province of most of our modern 
understandings of “religion.” I found both validity and utility in 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s trenchant observation that the move from 
medieval to modern in the West was one in which “the specific 
character of religion becomes clearer at the cost of diminishing its con­
tent.”10 1 MacIntyre means that both modernity and the growth of the 
explanatory power of the various exact sciences have engendered—as a 
kind of by-product—a certain precision about the exact domain of 
religion. It was, after all, within the modern period that words for 
“religion” appeared in many languages, including Japanese.12 One 
aspect of this attempt to define and delimit exactly what is meant by 
“religion,” however, has been the implicit assumption that whole 
domains of experience and explanation now lie outside that which 
Christianity or Buddhism once claimed to explain. That is to say, in 
modern contexts the center or essence of religion has emerged as “the 
sacred” or “faith” or the “experience of the numinous” or 
whatever—but the common feature of these various definitions is that 
each of them is at the same time a delimitation. Paul Tillich’s well- 
known depiction of religion as that which deals with man’s “ultimate 
concern” is a case in point; a distinctive characteristic of the ultimate is 
that it is not only high but also narrow. Such a definition is, I think, 
distinctly modern and arrived at after a whole array of less-than- 
ultimate concerns have been willy-nilly removed from the authority 
and explanatory domain of the traditional ecclesiastical institution.
10 Sanford, pp. 126-127.
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?” in 
Brian R. Wilson, ed., Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 62-77, and 
LaFleur, The Karma of Words, pp. 27, 167.
12 An interesting and important discussion of this is Osumi Kazuo, ChQsei shisO-shi 
e no kOsO: Rekishi, bungaku, shakyO (Tokyo: Meicho KankOkai, 1984), p. 91 ff.
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This was most likely an inescapable development. My concern, 
however, was less with the modernization process than with an applica­
tion of MacIntyre’s formulation in order to grasp its implications for 
medievalists. That is, it makes sense to uncover the logical corollary of 
MacIntyre’s observation that in the modern world “the specific 
character of religion has become clearer at the cost of diminishing its 
content” and take note of the fact that in medieval contexts the specific 
character of religion remained vague but to the advantage of contents 
whose scope was commensurably large. Practically this means that 
Christianity in medieval Europe and Buddhism in medieval Japan were 
mutatis mutandis each much more culturally agglutinative and at- 
titudinally triumphalist than either of their counterparts in modern con­
texts—contexts, that is, in which science has taken over vast portions 
of what requires explanation and manipulation in culture. Therefore, 
what the modern theologian, philosopher of religion, or historian of 
religion defines as “religion” may often be far too constricted a rubric 
to account for what Christianity or Buddhism were in their respective 
medieval contexts.
It takes, therefore, an act of historical imagination to reach back in 
time to what lies on the far side of Descartes, Kant, and especially 
Schleiermacher—that is, to a medieval epoch in which frameworks 
such as Christianity or Buddhism claimed for themselves the right and 
capacity to deal not only in “salvation” or the “holy” narrowly 
defined but also the whole domain of things about which human beings 
are naturally curious enough to seek an explanation. This, I would con­
tend, is the value of going after the meaning of medievality through the 
insights of Kuhn and MacIntyre rather than the definitions of religion 
formulated in modern contexts, especially since the latter tend to stress 
subjective and “inner” experiences as the center of religion.
If this is so for all medieval contexts it is, I would hold, a fortiori the 
case for ones informed by Buddhism. This is why it is hazardous to in­
terpret the title and contents of a work such as the Nihon ryOiki 
through the rubric of “miracle”—as if such had a univocal meaning. It 
is easy to assume that, since the monk Kydkai’s tales deal with paranor­
mal events and came from a time when a “religious” institution was 
growing in social power, they have a role and intentionality similar to 
the fantastic tales and miracle plays, for instance, of medieval Europe; 
in such an interpretation they become another case of what is assumed 
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to be a universalizable penchant for piety and faith—especially among 
the less educated portion of society.13 It is to assume that the finer 
nuances of difference between religious philosophies can be found at 
higher levels of doctrinal discussion but that the religion of the com­
mon people is, after all, the same thing the world over—that is, a sim­
ple “faith” and piety that is often not very different from gullibility 
vis-a-vis stories or demonstrations issuing from charismatic persons or 
authoritative institutions.
15 This approach to the Nihon ryOiki was adopted by KyOko Motomochi Nakamura 
in her introduction and translation; see her Miraculous Stories from the Japanese Bud­
dhist Tradition: The Nihon RyOiki of the Monk KyOkai (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1973) and my review in the Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 43:2 (June 1975), pp. 266-274. Martin Collcutt may be tilting in the same direc­
tion when he writes that in his own reading of that work its author, KyOkai, is dealing 
with “the same old human nature’* (Collcutt, p. 149).
I think this view, even though widely held in the academy, may very 
well be wrong. What makes the interpretation of the Nihon ryOiki such 
a good place to examine the matter is the fact that it was clearly 
intended to be understood by unsophisticated, common people— 
especially after being incorporated into the sermons of Buddhist 
preachers. What deserves attention, I think, is not just the fact that 
the eighth-century Japanese work includes accounts of bizarre and 
highly-unlikely events but the frame of interpretation given these 
works as a whole. And that interpretation is strikingly different from 
the interpretations of “miracles” that were from its earliest days such 
an important part of Christianity. The central point of all this is that in 
the Nihon ryOiki the events which are presented as divergent from 
things we ordinarily experience in life are said to be merely accelerated 
cases of karma and transmigration—that is, only relatively different 
from the basic framework of law that operates in and through all 
things in the universe. That is, anomalies are only apparently so; they 
exhibit rather than break the ordinary laws according to which all 
things operate. In Christianity, by contrast, miracles from the begin­
ning were interruptions in the laws of the cosmos and come into being 
because a personified divine intelligence outside the universe and its 
laws has the right and power to violate its laws at will. This understand­
ing of things, traditionally understood to be basic to Christianity’s 
view of God and the world, is different from that of traditional Bud- 15
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dhism. And this is a difference which, I would maintain, informs not 
only the discussions of the philosophers of each system but also enters 
into the way tales get told and interpreted to the common people. The 
difference goes all the way down.
This is not to deny that in the history of Buddhism there were per­
sons who, in order to enhance their own status or that of the institution 
they represented, happily soaked up the charisma that accrues often to 
a display of “sacred** power or what, in Eliade’s felicitous phrase, is a 
kratophany. There were those who knew that a kratophany that dumb­
founds the people often encourages them to trust the institution they 
themselves represent. Such persons, moreover, were often more in­
terested in gaining credence through stunning performances than 
through careful explanations of karma and the like. Nevertheless, the 
real weight of the Buddhist tradition, beginning already with the 
stories of Sakyamuni’s refusal to perform miracles, was on the side of 
those who insisted that orthopraxis consists of the explanation of the 
universe’s fundamental laws, not in performances which purport to 
show the abrogation of those laws.14 15From this point of view the real 
kratophany in Buddhism was held to lie in the power to explain.
14 Although Tertullian’s credo quia absurdum est formulation was not typical of 
Christianity, its very existence suggests one extreme point in Christianity’s ongoing ten­
sion with philosophers and skeptics who denied its basic claims about miracles. Such 
did not occur within Buddhism.
15 This, as I take it, is also part of Richard Rorty’s objection to a special something 
called “the scientific method” in his Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 191-210.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that this does not imply that from 
within Buddhism there arose what we know as modern man’s ability 
and right to explore the workings of natural law through controlled 
scientific experiments. Sanford’s misunderstanding of this point to the 
contrary, I have not claimed in The Karma of Words that a medieval 
Buddhist such as the monk KyOkai had an equivalent of a “modern, 
Western scientific view of the external world.** What I do take to be 
derivable from Kuhn’s notion of “normal science,’’ however, is a view 
of history which is not sharply divided into pre-scientific and scientific 
man; Kuhn moves quite far in the direction of seeing this development 
on a continuum, thus challenging positivism’s usual account of history 
even while fully recognizing that controlled experimentation has come 
to be the primary modality of modern explanation.15
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It is not science’s method of discovery which is at question but the 
untested and unverifiable view of history that seems to have accom­
panied positivism for so long. This view of history was accepted by 
most professional students of religion and even by many theologians, 
who then went on to rescue some elements of value in “pre-scientific” 
world views by acts of Entmythologisierung, by claims that the real im­
port of religion lies in salvation rather than explanation or, alternative­
ly, in the internal and subjective rather than external and objective. 
They also—unwisely, I think—tend to pour medieval worlds through 
its sieve to retain the residue of a specifically “religious” intentionality 
there. What falls away in this process is medieval man’s interest in 
explaining his world—and in connecting ultimate things with his 
curiosity about a vast array of less-than-ultimate matters.
Therefore, in contrast to this, I maintain that the author of the 
Nihon ryOiki was not merely interested in “faith” and “salvation” but 
also in karma’s capacity to explain the taxonomy of all beings in the 
world (the rokudO), strange events in the skies, the four different ways 
in which the tradition said beings get born into this world (shishd E9±), 
the etiology of specific illnesses, and the like. He was, in short, in­
terested in exploring and explaining the inner rationale—or what he 
took to be such—of an entire episteme, not in the much more narrow 
domain of faith and salvation. He used his eyes, ears, and especially his 
rhetorical skills to write a book which tried to shore up public con­
fidence in the Buddhist institution by providing what might be called 
the “kratophany of explanation.”
James Sanford does not accept that. He views my explanations of 
the Nihon rydiki as “cartwheels and backflips of interpretation,” 
preferring instead to see that text’s import as “salvational and 
religious.” Since by “religious” he seems to mean what I have here 
characterized as a distinctly modern view, it drives him, in my opinion, 
into his own mode of hermeneutical acrobatics. We can observe him on 
his trapeze in the following, his own version of what is going on in 
Kydkai’s text:
A simpler understanding of the “anomalous stories” of the 
Nihon ryOiki would seem to be that they were moral tales 
whose less than credible details constituted not the scientific 
placement of anomalies within a lawfully ordered (by karma) 
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universe, but only the obvious rhetoric or moral hyperbole, 
something to be “believed in” not as a matter of fact but at 
the levels of metaphor and allegory.16
16 Sanford, p. 127.
This is a very skillful act at the top of the tent but, at least for now, 1 
think I will stick with my more ground-level exercises—what Sanford 
has called my “cartwheels and backflips.” 1 prefer not to have to try to 
keep my balance up on some high notion that Kydkai meant his tales to 
be taken by his reader-listeners as merely “metaphor and allegory.” It 
is not that allegory was a literary technique unavailable to the medieval 
Japanese; it is merely that there is not the slightest hint anywhere in the 
Nihon ryOiki that its author wanted his readers to take his stories and 
the karma they purportedly demonstrate as anything other than literal 
facts. Kydkai’s rhetoric and hyperbole may be perfectly patent to San­
ford and me—especially because we can see these within a wide range 
of documents from diverse traditions. But if Kydkai had hinted as much 
to his contemporaneous readers, they would likely have concluded that 
his whole enterprise was a house of cards; he would have jeopardized 
his whole project if he had suggested that the things he described and 
the principle of karma they exemplify are only things to be “believed in 
not as matters of fact but at the levels of metaphor and allegory.”
The trouble with Sanford’s Kydkai is that he has been transformed 
into an eighth-century equivalent of the twentieth-century Christian 
parson who tells his congregation that the resurrection, while not to be 
taken literally any longer, is still true as a poem! Kydkai, who in Nara 
lived at the intellectually robust beginning of a new episteme, is made 
equivalent to the infamous de-mythologizing Bishop Robinson, who 
more than likely was trying to salvage bits and pieces of traditional 
Christianity—through the rubric of poetry—in an era when both its 
miracles and its general paradigm had encountered rough-sledding. To 
try to pull of such a stunt of interpretation involves, I would suggest, 
not only a modern distortion of a medieval text’s intentionality but 
also a transposition of problems occasioned by Christianity’s miracle­
based paradigm on to a Buddhist text which rests on a very different 
basis.
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Caskets, Keys, and Paradigms
As a historian of medieval Japan, Martin Collcutt provides a discus­
sion of The Karma of Words that understandably raises different ques­
tions than those that come out of the academic study of religion. He 
condones the overall aim of the book (to grasp “movements, texts or 
ideas within Buddhism ... as part of the whole fabric of a culture”) 
and goes along with my discussion of karma and the rokudO—at least 
for a good portion of the distance. Where he seems to wish to take 
leave and go in a different direction, however, happens to be at the cru­
cial point, a place where I am most eager to have him reconsider going 
the full distance. Thus in what follows I will hope to show what is at 
stake in a parting of paths where Collcutt seems to want to do so. I find 
him—although through the ventriloquism of hypothetical “others”— 
beginning to articulate his own worries in the following passage:
Some readers will question the pervasiveness and durability 
of rokudO ideas, or perhaps suggest that alternative notions— 
mujo or hongaku, for instance—were more influential. 
LaFleur may not convince everybody that he has found the 
golden key to unlock the intricate casket of medieval thought. 
He does show, however, just how pervasive and fertile the 
symbology of the six realms could be in the works he chooses 
for discussion in this volume.17
17 Collcutt, p. 149.
These are legitimate worries and I already know from various other 
conversations that Collcutt articulates the concerns not of hypothetical 
phantoms but of real people. I would like to untangle what I think are 
two separate questions here: first, whether any single concept or idea in 
Buddhism deserves recognition as that which shaped the era in intellec­
tual terms and, second, whether the concept of karma/rokudO is the 
right candidate for such status. Since I would answer both questions in 
the affirmative, some discussion of the alternatives is in order here.
The first question is really the question whether it makes any sense at 
all for the intellectual historian to think in terms of paradigms. This is 
because the notion of an epoch living its intellectual life in terms of a 
regnant paradigm is really to hold that thought in that era had some 
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shape or structure and was not just an inchoate mixture of free-floating 
ideas and symbols. It certainly also involves the connection between 
such ideas and the available technology—of whatever level—of that 
era. Thus, for instance, it would be foolish to think that Buddhism 
gained hegemony over the mind of the medieval Japanese as disem­
bodied ideas or without the ability to appeal to the impressive 
technology of temple architecture, sutra collection and production, 
and art that were part and parcel of its derivation from China and 
Korea in the days when Buddhism made its impact. All these undoubted­
ly dazzled the Japanese of the time under consideration; but Buddhism 
also attempted to make “sense” and in order to do so it had to be not 
just new knowledge but a new organization of knowledge. I do not 
wish to gainsay the point that Buddhist ideas other than karma were im­
portant and, in fact, my book deals at considerable length both with 
the notion of pervasive impermanence (mujo) and the doctrine of fun­
damental enlightenment (hongaku).
I would wish to hold out, however, for the idea that the era’s 
knowledge and questions were organized, not just a soup of freely- 
floating ideas and symbols. This is why I would like to convince Coll­
cutt to go farther with me and not take the side-path that would reduce 
karma and the rokudO taxonomy to merely one important “sym­
bology” among others. When symbols and symbologies all get treated 
as equals the possibility of seeing an era’s intellectual shape, its 
paradigm, is immediately lost. I wish to ask Collcutt and others not to 
become too egalitarian too quickly; 1 would like them to test farther 
and deeper my hypothesis that karma and the rokudO taxonomy quite 
suddenly and quickly came to dominate intellectual life in Japan.18 I 
hold that, because it made “sense” on many levels as an explanatory 
system, karma literally made the mind of medieval Japan. Moreover, it 
was an idea intelligible to commoners and the elite alike. Karma made 
its bite into the collective mind by maintaining that it was in full opera­
tion in every place and every time—for better or for worse. A person 
did not have to go to some place special, holy, or sacrosanct to get in
18 This question is and must remain separable, I think, from questions as to what 
constituted the principal teachings of earliest Buddhism in India or what Buddhists in 
contemporary contexts have come to define as the central message or philosophical 
thrust of their tradition today. In neither of these is karma likely to emerge as a prin­
cipal candidate for centrality.
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touch with karma; sacred mountains and temples but also ordinary rice­
fields and marketplaces—all were the “field” of its operation. Likewise 
its practical articulation along the six paths of species-transmigration 
was explained as the reason why certain beings were born as emperors 
in palaces or as kami in sacred shrines. That same working, differently 
directed, brought other beings into new life-forms in the barnyard or 
into destitute families within the human species.19 The notion of karma 
dissolved—at least potentially—any division between the holy and pro­
fane and moved the effective reach of Buddhist teaching into every 
niche of existence. To that degree it was not only a comprehensive new 
idea but also a fairly revolutionary one. That is why I maintain we not 
only need a paradigm to grasp the shape of medieval Japan but also 
that karma is the most apt candidate for that position.
19 The rokudO, even though a taxonomy, was not static; stress was always on the 
movement through its various rubrics. Perhaps, as Terada Tdru suggests, there is even 
linkage between this and the notion of the various arts as “ways” that developed and 
had such importance in medieval life. See Terada TOru, Michi no ShisO (Tokyo: SObun- 
sha, 1978), especially pp. 6-7.
Any such candidate, however, must show not only universality but 
also a certain flexibility in the era which it serves. This point can, 
perhaps, be best illustrated by teasing out some of the implications of a 
vivid metaphor employed by Collcutt who, as noted above, wrote that 
in The Karma of Words I may not have convinced everyone that I had 
found “the golden key to unlock the intricate casket of medieval 
thought.” I do not wish to play a mere game with words but, inasmuch 
as this does touch on the historical functions of something offered as 
an era’s paradigm, the point deserves exploration. I think there is a 
fallacy in Collcutt’s analogy; that is, the relationship between a 
paradigm and the epoch of history within which it does its work is not 
the same as that between a key and the casket or a box it was fashioned 
to open. In our ordinary experience the relationship between keys and 
locks must remain a fixed one through time. To alter the shape of the 
key or allow rust to form on the tines of a lock is to render their mutual 
relationship literally un-workabie. When such happens it becomes 
necessary—either by lubrication or scraping—to return the two back to 
their “original” condition so that they might function together once 
again.
By contrast, an effective paradigm, as Kuhn and others have shown,
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usually begins to undergo some adjustment and change as soon as it is 
introduced as the new model for comprehensive explanation of things. 
Since it seems clear that, to date, humanity has not yet found a single 
paradigm that will remain everlastingly valid, a “good” paradigm is 
one that will retain a high degree of workability even while undergoing 
modification due to the need to incorporate new data or old data other­
wise neglected. There always seems to come a point, however, when the 
elasticity of even the best of paradigms has been stretched too far— 
that is, when the quantity and/or importance of unassimilable and 
anomalous data has brought the existing paradigm to a breaking point. 
Then it will be replaced by something else that literally “works” 
better—at least for a time—and this change is what is referred to as a 
“paradigm-shift.” Up to that point of shift, however, one index to a 
regnant paradigm’s view will be its flexibility under stress; it will not 
only incorporate new data but, as Alasdair MacIntyre shows, also give 
an account of why older paradigms seemed to work so well for so 
long.20
20 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the 
Philosophy of Science,” The Monist 60:4, p. 467, and LaFleur, The Karma of Words, 
p. 46.
This was a point which, I had hoped, was clear in The Karma of 
Words. It is the reason why there I went into considerable detail to 
show that the karma/ro£wtto explanation raised new problems and 
difficulties even as it was proposed to solve others. The story of Bud­
dhism throughout the medieval epoch of Japan’s history is one of 
continuing adjustments and changes in that paradigm. I repeatedly 
referred to the “tensions” that attended the concept of karma and sug­
gested, in addition, at least four basic modalities according to which 
the rokudd taxonomy was stretched and qualified in attempts to make 
it “work” better—not only to the intellectual but also the emotional 
satisfaction of persons alive then. The great thinkers identified with the 
Kamakura period were, I think, the high point in the ongoing effort to 
adjust, qualify, and—if at all possible—bring the paradigm into a form 
of final perfection. The fact that this effort and activity continued on 
after them suggests that such perfection in the paradigm’s formulation 
remained forever elusive.
I mention this because 1 am somewhat at a loss to understand how 
Martin Collcutt could have read my book and come away with the im-
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pression that what was offered there was, in his words, presented as “a 
monolithic Buddhist episteme erected by Kydkai and disposed of by 
Motoori Norinaga” and in need of greater “flexibility. ”21 My guess is 
that this arose from a misunderstanding of the specific role of 
something claimed to be an era’s paradigm—that is, sufficiently struc­
tured and comprehensive to organize the questions and knowledge of a 
given era but at the same time flexible enough to accommodate change 
during that same period of time. I agree that something “monolithic” 
will not qualify but I also would suggest that my offering of karma/ 
rokudO was far from monolithic. On the other hand I do worry about 
the alternative Collcutt seems willing to adopt. It threatens, I think, to 
become quite readily a disorganized mixture of free-floating concepts 
and symbols, none of which had the power to become the organizing 
principle for an epoch’s grasp on reality. This is to say that a touch of 
mujd> a pinch of mappd-shisd, an element of honji-suijaku and even a 
very generous helping of hongaku may comprise a mixture of things 
but will not, I think, in the aggregate add up to an epoch with a 
discernible shape. Therefore, while perfectly ready to consider other 
viable candidates, I will for now hang on to the things offered in The 
Karma of Words as the best I can suggest for making sense of medieval 
Japan in intellectual terms.
21 Collcutt, p. 151.
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